David G. Chandler (1934–2004)

My knowledge of the Napoleonic wars is limited to this side of the Atlantic – the War of 1812 – and fiction: War and Peace, Sharpe, Hornblower, Aubrey/Maturin, and even Georgette Heyer. I’d heard of the 1806 Battle of Jena – often called Jena-Auerstādt – but didn’t know much beyond that. This Osprey Campaign book was therefore enlightening.

The French provoked Prussia into declaring war by reneging on a previous agreement that would have transferred Hanover to Prussian control; Napoleon instead offered it to the English in the hopes that would lead to a treaty. The Prussians couldn’t take this blow to their national honor (Author David Chandler argues that Queen Louise of Prussia was a major factor in pushing for war, reportedly by denying her husband conjugal privileges – sort of a reverse Lysistrata). Unfortunately for Prussia, King Frederick-William III was not his grandfather, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon Bonaparte was Napoleon Bonaparte.

The Prussian organization was characterized by arguments among the nobility, more concerned about who was going to get the glory instead of how to fight the war. The French, on the other hand, had an efficient general staff headed by Louis Alexandre Berthier, who Chandler claims “…was the greatest chief of staff in history.” Berthier’s talent was translating Napoleon’s general instructions into specific orders for each component of the army, telling them when to march and where to march to. As a result, the French invaded when the Prussians were still arguing about what they were going to do.

The French seized key road junctions before the Prussians could react and debouched near the town of Jena, while another corps under Marshal Davout collided with the Prussians at Auerstādt, about 12 kilometers north. Both battles were hard-fought; although the Prussian officer corps was no match for Napoleon’s marshals, the Prussian soldiers were just as brave as the French. Chandler argues that major factor in the French victories was tactical flexibility; French units could change quickly from column to line to square to take advantage of battlefield conditions.

The Prussians eventually broke and routed; the French pursued and eventually occupied Hamburg, Stettin, Magdeburg, and Berlin, taking 43000 prisoners. Napoleon redeployed to take on the remnants of the Prussian army and the Russians, eventually concluding a separate peace with each at Tilsit in 1807.

Like most Osprey books, this one is heavy on illustrations – the generals on each side, depictions of uniforms, a table of organization for each army, and maps of the battlefield. I found all the sections – pre-campaign diplomacy, the march to the battlefield, the battles, the pursuit, and the aftermath – quite clear and easy to follow. I’ll have to read some more.… (mer)

Though nearly a half-century has passed since its initial publication, David Chandler's study of Napoleon Bonaparte's military campaigns remains unsurpassed -- and after reading it, it is easy to see why. Over the course of a thousand pages, Chandler charts Napoleon's military career, from his early years at the École Militaire to his final defeat in the Hundred Days campaign. Aided by a generous selection of maps, he details the maneuvers of every campaign and the course of every major battle, each of which he concludes with a convincing analysis of the factors involved in the result. While the campaigns themselves dominate the text, Chandler also analyses the armies involved, describing their organization, their weaponry, and their reputation on the battlefield. The combination provides readers with an encyclopedic account of Napoleon's wars, yet Chandler's writing reflects the flair and dash that came to be associated with his subject's battlefield exploits. The result is a work that, despite its age, remains the standard by which histories of Napoleonic warfare are judged.… (mer)