D. M. Giangreco

Having been driven to distraction by the so-called revisionist historians over the issue of whether the use of atomic weapons against Japan was justifiable, this author has two main aims. One is to demonstrate that the Japanese military was not operationally bankrupt when it came to the defense of the home islands. The other is to illustrate the American policy process which generated the horrendous potential casualty figures that are often used to justify the use of atomic weapons, and to demonstrate the validity of those figures. Giangreco seems to be successful on both these counts.

Mind you, this book is best read as an analysis of military planning on either side of the hill. The best book on the policy twists and turns of how the Japanese surrender came about is still Frank's "Downfall," followed by a cautious dip in Hasegawa's revisionist-flavored "Racing with the Enemy."

As for criticisms, I'm not sure that Giangreco is well-served by his occasionally tendentious tone, though that is mostly reserved for the introduction and footnotes. Two, I miss the inclusion of a bibliography.… (mer)