Boris Kavalerchik

At the time when I was putting in an inter-library loan request for this book, there was the thought at the back of my mind that this could turn out to be a throwaway volume; the publisher is notorious for pushing out as many pot-boilers as winners. However, it turns out that this is quite a useful little item. Kavalerchik's main concern is to explain to the general reader why the great collection of tanks the Soviet Union had produced by 1941 did not translate into more military power. After first considering how the Germans became the standard by which people measure mechanized troops against, Kavalerchik works through all the liabilities that hindered Soviet military performance, such as bad organization, failures of technological development, lack of good staff work and bad mobilization plans; meaning that the Red Army had to learn the hard way how to handle tank forces. One suspects that the target reader is someone who plays "World of Tanks" or "War Thunder" on a regular basis and at least recognizes the vehicles the German and Soviet armies sent into action.… (mer)