"Operation Shakespeare", by John Shiffman, tells an unsettling story of how many foreign nations conspire to illegally obtain sophisticated technology, parts, and even complete weapon systems from United States manufacturers, suppliers or users. Export controls and severe sharing restrictions on this high-tech equipment have proven to be surprisingly ineffective. This may be due, in some part, to overly complex rules and regulations and suppliers misunderstandings, but a willingness to look past the regulations for greed and profit may play the larger role. The net result of this illegal trade is that the years of research and development and millions of dollars spent to develop this technology can be lost overnight. Technology and systems designed to advance and protect American interests are being obtained by others, especially competitors and unfriendly countries, making any technological advantage disappear.

Losses can occur in any of a variety of industries, but the author goes into some detail of how this can impact the military. Homeland Security personnel became aware of Middle East buyers seeking complex military parts, which if obtained, could be used against American forces fighting in that region. They had discovered, for example, many of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) used in Iraq to cause so many American casualties were as effective as they were because of American sensors and timers illegally obtained and used in the IEDs.

Determining how these devices were obtained can be difficult, and prosecuting those involved much more difficult, especially if the culprits remain on foreign soil. Government managers often won't spend the time and trouble to prosecute cases such as these since the likelihood of success is low, and the cost is high. Instead, many prosecutors stick to the easy cases involving drug busts at the border, or easy smuggling cases which fall in their lap. The rare exception to this attitude was an operation designated Operation Shakespeare. Agents set up a sting operation to meet, befriend, and trap an active Iranian arms buyer. The Iranian broker had links with American companies, European banks, and clients in Iranian and Chinese governments, and was attempting to obtain missile guidance equipment, a variety of military hardware, radar jamming devices, etc. Eventually, the agents were successful in luring the arms broker to Georgia where he was arrested and jailed. His arrest produced a treasure trove of intelligence, allowing intelligence agents to open numerous other investigations. Unfortunately, few if any successful follow-up operations occurred, other than to warn U.S. manufacturers and suppliers of the sophisticated equipment to be more careful in following export restrictions. ( )