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Laddar... Free Speech Beyond Words: The Surprising Reach of the First Amendmentav Mark V. Tushnet
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Gå med i LibraryThing för att få reda på om du skulle tycka om den här boken. Det finns inga diskussioner på LibraryThing om den här boken. Formed around three articles by the authors about First Amendment protection for instrumental music, art (visual/performance), and nonsense, the book explores why the protection of these things at once seems so obvious to modern constitutional scholars and the Supreme Court but also is so difficult to defend using conventional First Amendment theories without a bunch of special pleading. Ultimately, the best answer seems to be that these things are socially understood to be speech—but that implies that the categories of “speech” might plausibly change to include (or perhaps exclude?) new things, such as dance or cuisine. The core claim of the book is that “[a]sking the easy questions can be surprisingly disturbing, because it reveals that the First Amendment’s foundations are less settled than we might suppose or want.” And the book does a good job of showing why the easy questions aren’t that easy. inga recensioner | lägg till en recension
A look at First Amendment coverage of music, non-representational art, and nonsense The Supreme Court has unanimously held that Jackson Pollock's paintings, Arnold Schöenberg's music, and Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky" are "unquestionably shielded" by the First Amendment. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense: all receive constitutional coverage under an amendment protecting "the freedom of speech," even though none involves what we typically think of as speech--the use of words to convey meaning. As a legal matter, the Court's conclusion is clearly correct, but its premises are murky, and they raise difficult questions about the possibilities and limitations of law and expression. Nonrepresentational art, instrumental music, and nonsense do not employ language in any traditional sense, and sometimes do not even involve the transmission of articulable ideas. How, then, can they be treated as "speech" for constitutional purposes? What does the difficulty of that question suggest for First Amendment law and theory? And can law resolve such inquiries without relying on aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy? Comprehensive and compelling, this book represents a sustained effort to account, constitutionally, for these modes of "speech." While it is firmly centered in debates about First Amendment issues, it addresses them in a novel way, using subject matter that is uniquely well suited to the task, and whose constitutional salience has been under-explored. Drawing on existing legal doctrine, aesthetics, and analytical philosophy, three celebrated law scholars show us how and why speech beyond words should be fundamental to our understanding of the First Amendment. Inga biblioteksbeskrivningar kunde hittas. |
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Google Books — Laddar... GenrerMelvil Decimal System (DDC)342.7308Social sciences Law Constitutional and administrative law North America Constitutional law--United States Jurisdiction over personsKlassifikation enligt LCBetygMedelbetyg: Inga betyg.Är det här du? |