Hanson argues that the military dominance of the West can be attributed to the idea of dissent, consensual government, and individualism. Hanson rejects racial explanations for this military preeminence, the dominance of technology and disagrees with environmental or geographical explanations such as the thesis advanced by Jared Diamond in Guns, Germs and Steel.

According to Hanson, Western values such as freedom, rationalism, and open dissent are a particulary lethal mix as the West has engaged in warfare. Even when non-Western societies win the occasional victory when warring against the West, it is only a temporary setback and the non-Western culture is dependent of Western tactics, technology, and has no inclination to fight to totally vanquish their foe. Therefore, the "Western way of war" will ultimately prevail. Hanson is careful to point out that Western warfare is not necessarily more (or less) moral than war as practiced by other cultures; but his argument posits that the "Western way of war" is unequaled in its devastation and decisiveness.

Nine battles illustrate a particular aspect of Western culture that Hanson believes contributes to the dominance of Western warfare: the Battle of Salamis 480 BCE, where the Greeks fought as a "free citizens," the Battle of Gaugamela 331 BCE in the decisive battle of annihilation, the Battle of Cannae 216 BCE emphasizing civic militarism, the Battle of Tours/Poitiers 732 CE and the concentration of infantry, the Battle of Tenochtitlan 1521 CE where technology and reason prevailed, the Battle of Lepanto 1571 or a victory for capitalism, the Battle of Rorke's Drift 1879 where British discipline held sway, the Battle of Midway 1942 demonstrating individualism, and the Tet Offensive 1968 where American dissent rose to the fore.

One of the biggest surprises of the book is the numerical superiority of the Americans during Tet. The Americans felt as though they lost though Hanson points out that the Vietcong were really decimated in the American counter-offensive. The work is an important corrective to the current American penchant for defeatism. Not surprisingly then, Hanson argues that the current American conflicts against insurgency and terrorism can result in an American victory.

Hanson in this work is "enjoyably controversial" (p. 613) according to Robin Lane Fox in his The Classical World.

[Xenophon's] Anabasis makes it clear, however, that the Greeks fought much differently than their adversaries and that such unique Hellenic characteristics of battle-- a sense of personal freedom, superior discipline, matchless weapons, egalitarian cameraderie, individual initiative, constant tactical adaptation and flexibility, preference for shock battle of heavy infantry-- were themselves the murderous dividends of Hellenic culture at large. The peculiar way Greeks killed grew out of consensual government, equality among the middling classes, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism, and rationalism. [page 4]
In contrast to these enormous armies of screaming "barbarians" without consensual governments and written constitutions-- "formidable in outward bulk, with unbearable loud yelling and the frightful appearance of weapons brandished in the air" [today, Palestinians and other undisciplined savages fire automatic weapons into the air, despite the obvious hazards of celebratory gunfire]-- "citizens of states like yours," [the Spartan general] Brasidas assures his men, "stand their ground." Notice that Brasidas says nothing about skin color, race, or religion. [And neither does Omdurman.org.] Instead, he simplistically connects military discipline, fighting in rank, and the preference for shock battle with the existence of popular and consensual government, which gave the average infantryman in the phalanx a sense of equality and a superior spirit to his enemies. [pages 6-7]

The most gallant Apaches-- murderously brave in raiding and skirmishing on the Great Plains-- would have gone home after the first hour of Gettysburg. [page 9]

The Western way of war is so lethal precisely because it is so amoral-- shackled rarely by concerns of ritual, tradition, religion, or ethics, by anything other than military necessity.
...Western armies often fight with and for a sense of legal freedom. They are frequently products of civic militarism or constitutional governments and thus are overseen by those outside religion and the military itself. The rare word "citizen" exists in the European vocabularies.
...Because free inquiry and rationalism are Western trademarks, European armies have marched to war with weapons either superior or equal to their adversaries, and have often been supplied far more lavishly through the Western marriage of capitalism, finance, and sophisticated logistics.
...Western capitalists and scientists alike have been singularly pragmatic and utilitarian, with little to fear from religious fundamentalists, state censors, or stern cultural conservatives. [pages 21-22]

Battles Cited, and their Outcomes

Salamis (28 September, 480 BCE, Greece versus Persia): Persians slaughtered like sheep
Gaugamela (1 October 331 BCE, Alexander the Great's Macedonians versus Persians): Persians slaughtered like sheep
Cannae (2 August, 216 BCE, Hannibal's Carthaginians versus Rome): Romans defeated but Rome continued to fight until it won the Second Punic War.
Poitiers (or Tours) (11 October, 732, Charles Martel's Franks versus a Saracen horde): Saracens defeated
Tenochtitlan (24 June 1520- 13 August, 1521, Hernando Cortez's Spaniards versus Aztecs): Aztecs defeated
Lepanto (7 October, 1571, Mediterranean Europe versus Ottoman Turkish horde): Turkish horde defeated
Rorke's Drift (22-23 January, 1879, England versus Zulus): English defeat 40-to-one odds, and the Zulus did have some guns.
Midway (4-8 June, 1942, United States versus Japan): Japanese defeated
Tet (31 January 1968 to 6 April, 1968, United States versus North Vietnam): North Vietnamese defeated
Of these nine battles, a non-Western culture was the victor in only one-- and Hannibal had, in fact, adopted many Western (Roman-style) methods and tactics. He made expressly sure that he was not going to lead any undisciplined hordes against Rome's mighty legions. Additional examples:
Thermopylae (Persian horde of perhaps a million men versus 1000 or so Greeks): 300 Spartans killed to last man, but only because a dirty traitor (Ephialtes) showed the Persians how to get behind the Spartans. King Xerxes lost ten to twenty thousand soldiers in exchange.
Aleksandr V. Suvorov's anti-Turkish campaigns (late 18th century): Suvorov claimed 100,000 Turkish casualties in exchange for 500 Russians. He ascribed this to superior Russian training and discipline.
Isandhlwana (20,000 or so Zulus versus 1800 British and native troops): British annihilated, but Zulus suffer heavy losses as well. Had the British been able to get their ammunition boxes open, matters might have turned out differently...
Operation Desert Storm (1991, United States and England versus numerically-superior Iraqis): Iraqis routed and slaughtered like sheep on the "Highway of Death," until they surrendered in droves. Allied fatalities numbered below 500.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003, United States and England versus numerically-superior Iraqis): Saddam Hussein kicked out and possibly killed, along with his murderous sons. Good riddance. Allied fatalities numbered below 200 despite the claims of Iraq's "information minister" to the contrary.
Hansen also points out that the non-Westerners usually had the advantage of the home ground. The Europeans were usually the "visitors," and subject to the disadvantages of numerical inferiority, long supply lines, and so on. Cannae (and the sack of Constantinople in 1453) may well have been the only instances in history of non-European armies defeating Europeans in Europe. A Turkish horde did reach the gates of Vienna in 1683 but it was repulsed very soundly.

This is pretty insightful if you can get past the obvious biases of the author. I've found that there isn't any such thing as an unbiased account so it doesn't really bother me. I mainly got this due to the section on Rorke's Drift, but found the rest of it quite interesting as well. ( )

I was disappointed by the essentially triumphalist storyline that ran throughout this book. Ultimately, he does not make good on substantiating his assertion that the Western tradition of dissent, importance on intentiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenship produced superior arms and soldiers.

The battle descriptions are confusing and written in a colloquial manner that does not do justice to the seriousness of the subject. ( )

Interesting juxtaposition to Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel - why has "Western" culture been so historically dominant in so many influential military conflicts, and how does this help to explain the "Western World's" current (or at least, recent) pre-eminence? ( )

The author views cultures through the lens of war and their proficiency at killing. A fascinating look at the contrasts between the West and the East. A good antidote to Guns, Germs, and Steel. ( )