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Om visshet (1969)

av Ludwig Wittgenstein

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MedlemmarRecensionerPopularitetGenomsnittligt betygOmnämnanden
1,191312,571 (4.14)8
Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore?s defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein?s reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.
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    Världen som vilja och föreställning av Arthur Schopenhauer (galacticus)
    galacticus: Wittgenstein followed Schopenhauer early in his career; his conclusions are best understood in light of Schopenhauer's works.
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Collected notes from Wittgenstein published posthumously. He struggles to reconcile Moore's smart-ass "here is a hand" response to skepticism with the challenges strong skepticism poses, and fit it into his own language-game model. He approaches several solutions, finds them unsatisfactory and re-starts. His overall approach is to look at what we mean when we say "I know" rather than to prescribe a universal level of proper skepticism. ( )
  poirotketchup | Mar 18, 2021 |
I’m not…certain how I feel about this book. What I mean more precisely is…that…it is impossible for me to be certain how I feel about this book. In fact, it’s impossible for me to really be certain of anything whatsoever. According to Mr. Ludvig Vittgen-shhhhhhhtein, that is.

On Certainty was a rather enjoyable read despite the fact that it contained 676 numbered paragraphs of somewhat repetitive analysis. But if one is as fascinated by philosophy as I am, then it’s no bother. Some would say Wittgenstein is a philosopher’s philosopher because he spends much of his effort debunking traditional philosophy. Here is what I can tease out of this text:

All things that we are certain of, including science, are part of a world-view. World-views are based on language and language games (meaning the “rules” we create for language, in order to understand each other.) All the things that we consider to be “certain” or sure (i.e. True), are actually premises for our language games. In other words, you can point to every fact we are so sure of, “The world is spherical,” or “This is my hand,” and they always end up pointing back to what are assumptions of the language game. Things we believe are so because we defined them in our language game as so. He would say that nothing is ever truly objective because there is always some lower level “fact” that points to another “fact” that points to a “fact” that points back to language. It points back to an assertion, something we are taught. Facts are really socially constructed in our worldview. Certainty is constructed meaning, not objective meaning.

Certainty has no ground. If you say, “I know the earth is round,” how is that different from “I am of unshakeable conviction that the earth is round.” What “I know” really means is that you are convinced of some set of rules you have been taught. LW would say that in the end every “I know” is merely a statement of your relation to an accepted world view, not a factual ground. All our grounds are merely hardened propositions accepted by each of us in order to be welcomed into a taught world-view.

There is no ground beneath her feet.

He compares the world views of different societies as well to further communicate his point. In some tribal society, it may be the shaman who causes rain, not a meteorological phenomenon. Are they demonstrably wrong? Perhaps…but what if…cause and effect were actually wrong. Scientific evidence is all based on cause and effect being true, but it’s impossible to objectively demonstrate cause and effect. Even if something happens a billion times repeatedly…that is not objective proof that it will always happen that way. Or that it happens for the reason we thought it did. The future cannot be predicted. Science can suddenly alter its worldview and then suddenly the facts that were our ground, no longer are. There is no objective ground. No certainty.

Some writers claim that LW actually debunks skepticism because he claims skepticism’s questions (such as “Is this all a dream?”) don’t fit into the language game of a given world view so they are not coherent questions. For a question to be coherent, it must fit into the language game. But I don’t see that. He actually seems like the ultimate skeptic, to me. You just need to reword the questions and ask things like, “If we can’t be certain of anything, because in the end language only points to itself, then how can we be certain we aren’t all just in a dream?”

So how can we? ( )
1 rösta David_David_Katzman | Nov 26, 2013 |
This compilation of notes regarding Wittgenstein's views on the nature of propositions in our "language game" is both digestible and provocative in its overall exploration of the topic. Perhaps because these are notes, the book is written is a very direct manner without convolution or wordiness, leaving little room for excess. What space remains is well employed. A number of times, Wittgenstein immediately reflects on the competency of his own assertions, throws in a bit of humor, and even the quickest flashes of poetic phrasing. This is a brief work, and a readable one at that, but it is by no means shallow. You are at the deep end of the pool here, but you're in with a very good swimmer. ( )
  poetontheone | Jun 26, 2011 |
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Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore?s defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein?s reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.

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