Iris Murdoch argues that morality and the quest for Good is missing from modern philosophy. ( )

Ik ga eerlijk zijn: dit is duidelijk voer voor filosofisch geschoolden, en dus deels buiten mijn bereik. Zeker het eerste essays (van drie) is zeer condens geschreven en voor mij nagenoeg niet te volgen. Het tweede las ik integraal, en ook daar is aandacht nodig maar het valt beter mee. Murdoch focust zich blijkbaar op moraalfilosofie en gaat na wat de bron zou kunnen zijn van ‘het goede’ en ‘het goede doen’. Een kleine verwijzing naar Simone Weil maakte me onmiddellijk duidelijk dat ze niet vies is van enig neo-platonisme, en dat stoorde me wel. Haar kritiek op het existentialisme en op het humanisme is erg scherp, maar ik begrijp het wel: die twee stromingen negeren gewoon de vraag naar de bron van het goede. Niet dat Murdoch daarmee automatisch op een transcendent-religieus niveau zit, maar via de omweg van de kunst (en ‘het schone’) weet ze wel duidelijk te maken dat de realiteit op zijn minst een dimensie bezit die de individuele mens overstijgt.

In three essays, Murdoch challenges the prevailing view in moral philosophy. This she describes as the Kantian / Existentialist world view, where moral choices are made by a free agent who comes to a dispassionate view of the situation, sets out the options available, then chooses from among these after much consideration and thought, thereby expressing their personal moral character. Murdoch challenges the tenets of this view, and introduces a new framework of moral philosophy here that provides an appealing alternative, with a focus not on the moment of choice, but on the use of attention of the moral agent.

In this system the description of the situation (the moral problem) is coloured by the personal history, limited knowledge, biases, prejudices, and perhaps ignorance of the moral agent, and this results in a default choice among the available alternatives that is more or less unavoidable given their understanding / framing of the moral situation. Here, the moral burden is placed on the agent in their use of attention. If they attend to the situation, and strive to understand it properly, give it dispassionate attention with the aim of understanding it correctly and without prejudice, then this will result in their having enough information available so that a just action will naturally result. Where the agent does not give attention to understanding the situation, for example if their focus of attention is influenced by ego, or prejudice, or laziness, or no desire to see the truth, then what results is an inaccurate framing of the situation, and thus often a morally bad choice results. This also brings in the role of language, the language we use in our head perhaps, or that we hear from other people discussing a situation. Words are always value-laden, and a situation can often just as accurately be described in words with negative affect, or that carry derogatory connotations, as those with positive overtones, or that are psychologically neutral.

Murdoch then builds upon this system to claim that what drives attention to the truth of reality is Love. Love is central here in the moral agent's use of attention, and Murdoch supports this with some resurrection of Plato's ideas on this topic. Hence Love becomes the path toward right action, and she restores its central position in philosophy to the prominence it once held under Plato.

Overall this is a very stimulating group of essays that present a coherent and plausible alternative to the predominant view of moral philosophy. They are clear and easily readable, with helpful illustrations. As a work of moral philosophy this is original and productive in its explanations within the sphere of moral philosophy. ( )

Iris Murdoch, following G.E.M. Anscombe’s foundational 1958 critique of modern moral theories, refines and narrows the critique to address the specific problem of the ideal moral agent in The Sovereignty of Good (1970). She critiques the formulation of the moral exemplar as a generic, abstract, independent, rational, and emotionally neutral being who creates value exclusively by fiat of will. While she begins with Kant’s infamously formal view of moral agency, she finds these problems to be present in traditions as diverse as British analytic philosophy and Existentialism. In all cases, the agent allegedly creates value for himself, rather than recognizing, discovering, or responding to value as a potentially given feature of our place in the world.

Murdoch unpacks Anscombe’s call for an adequate psychological account of ethics by focusing on moral perception, specifically how an accurate view of the world requires an attention to it that is already invested in seeing it for itself, in its particularity--she calls this particularity its “reality” and she calls this attention “love.” Loving, according to Murdoch is an act of “unselfing”: of seeing the other (and the world) from an unselfish, unoccluded perspective. Love, not disinterested reason, offers us the only accurate picture of reality.

According to Murdoch, understanding ethics as a way of perceiving requires “the liberation of morality, and of philosophy as a study of human nature, from the domination of science: or rather from the domination of inexact ideas of science which haunt philosophers and other thinkers.”(26) The worst of these ‘inexact ideas’ is the idea that morality has access to objective facts that can be impartially and “empirically” relied upon for moral judgment. How we evaluate any given moral situation is ineliminably a product of one’s own perspective--the “facts” of a moral situation are already judgments. There is no impersonal perspective to occupy when we perceive our moral lives, and therefore neither the facts nor judgments of morality can conform to the requirements of scientific objectivity and impartiality.

While these concerns may appear abstract and theoretical, Murdoch illustrates their everyday relevance through a detailed example of the moral difficulties of a mother (M) who disapproves of her daughter-in-law (D), and undertakes the moral work of changing her perception of D. Murdoch provides many possible accounts of M’s motivation to see D in a favorable light, ranging from the self-interested desire to simply abide D’s intrusion in her life to the moral desire to see D fairly and honestly. From the outside, M appears no different, despite her change in moral perspective. While modern moral theories dispute the value of inner life in favor of concrete action, Murdoch wants to say what M has done is a morally commendable act of loving, and that she has in fact undergone a significant change that needs to be recognized by moral philosophers. ( )

The nature of goodness is an issue today in the writings of Iris Murdoch. The Sovereignty of Good includes three essays by her. In reading her essay, "The Sovereignty of Good over other concepts", I found her returning to the allegory of the cave and the metaphor of the Sun that I first read in Plato. Murdoch claims that "'Good is a transcendent reality' means that virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is." (p 91) For Murdoch this is a claim that Art is the way that humans can reach this unity in that,
"The mind which has ascended to the vision of the Good can subsequently see concepts through which it has ascended (art, work, nature, people, ideas, institutions, situations, etc.) in their true nature and in their proper relationships to each other." (p 92)
The discussion of the good by Iris Murdoch reconsiders this and other themes found in Marcus Aurelius and Plato. It is a difficult but worthwhile read. ( )