HemGrupperDiskuteraMerTidsandan
Känner du till SantaThing, LibraryThings julklappsbyte?
avfärda
Denna webbplats använder kakor för att fungera optimalt, analysera användarbeteende och för att visa reklam (om du inte är inloggad). Genom att använda LibraryThing intygar du att du har läst och förstått våra Regler och integritetspolicy. All användning av denna webbplats lyder under dessa regler.
Hide this

Resultat från Google Book Search

Klicka på en bild för att gå till Google Book Search.

Laddar...

Guilty Robots, Happy Dogs: The Question of Alien Minds

av David Sawyer McFarland

MedlemmarRecensionerPopularitetGenomsnittligt betygOmnämnanden
453428,206 (3.19)1
When we interact with animals, we intuitively read thoughts and feelings into their expressions and actions - it is easy to suppose that they have minds like ours. And as technology grows more sophisticated, we might soon find ourselves interpreting the behaviour of robots too in human terms.It is natural for us to humanize other beings in this way, but is it philosophically or scientifically justifiable? How different might the minds of animals or machines be to ours? As David McFarland asks here, could robots ever feel guilty, and is it correct to suppose your dog can truly behappy? Can we ever know what non-human minds might be like, or will the answer be forever out of our reach?These are central and important questions in the philosophy of mind, and this book is an accessible exploration of the differing philosophical positions that can be taken on the issue. McFarland looks not only at philosophy, but also examines new evidence from the science of animal behaviour plusthe latest developments in robotics and artificial intelligence, to show how many different - and sometimes surprising - conclusions we can draw about the nature of 'alien minds'.… (mer)

Ingen/inga.

Ingen/inga
Laddar...

Gå med i LibraryThing för att få reda på om du skulle tycka om den här boken.

Det finns inga diskussioner på LibraryThing om den här boken.

» Se även 1 omnämnande

Visar 3 av 3
Easy to read yet sufficiently comprehensive introduction. ( )
  Mithril | Jan 22, 2010 |
(posted on my blog: davenichols.net)

David McFarland, someone well-versed in biological robots and zoology, offers up this quick philosophical (not technical) discussion of just how we go about identifying 'alien' minds. 'Alien' here refers to non-human minds, not the ET variety, specifically those of animals and robots. He assumes as fundamental the need to identify both rationality and subjectivity in an 'other' before we could ascribe to it a mind. Most of the book involves dealing with the numerous and convoluted problems associated with those identifications.

To move his ideas along, McFarland uses his dog Border as the animal example, and a conceptual security robot for the other. Throughout the early parts of the book, the reader gets an intro to 'mindless machines' and the role design plays in both animals (through natural selection, environment, etc) and robots (engineer, programmer, etc).

The bulk of the book involves traditional philosophical considerations of intent, functionality, rationality, subjectivity, feelings, knowledge, and mind. Much of this discussion will be familiar to readers of Daniel Dennett (and Dennett is frequently referenced) and/or general philosophy of mind. There are some interesting applications of these concepts to robots (especially), but I'd advise the novice philosophy reader to find a quiet room and have an optimal mind set before proceding through the middle sections (as I would advise on any good philosophy book).

Toward the end, the reader gets stronger discussions of mind as they may (or may not apply) to robots and animals. Many of the contradictions are pointed out, as well as the inherent difficulty (impossibility?) of determining the mind, mind set, or subjectivity of anything which might house them.

The end of the book falls off the truck, unfortunately. Throughout the chapters, McFarland clearly appears to be laying groundwork for his conclusions (and yes, I use this word in the philosophical not empirical sense), only to turn in a 'hedging all bets' card in the epilogue without any real opinion. He offers what may be possible, states that philosophers are all in disagreement, and proposes weakly that its basically up to the reader to determine what is going on inside that skull/robot. I recognize (both from reading this book and previous knowledge of many of the subjects) that a conclusion of any sort would not be likely in strong empirical terms, but at least McFarland should have let the reader know this was an exploration without an actual purpose other than to discuss the issues (does the Intentional Stance come into play here in his narrative?). I never expected McFarland to state whether he thought his dog had a mind, but he presented enough points of view that I expected him to accept one at some point. He never did. It was all one big lecture for the reader (enjoyable though it was).

The strongest points for me were his determination that mind and consciousness were just as much products of evolution and purpose (or for the robot, design and purpose) as any other phenotypic effect. His one strong conclusion was that we cannot expect an animal or a robot to ever have a mind or consciousness like ours. They don't have human brains, haven't been selected (or designed) under the same conditions, and therefore, if they have minds at all, those minds would conform to the specific needs and conditions of their respective developments.

Guilty Robots was worth the read, and with a stronger finish this would have been a four-star review. However, the weak ending, the progressing obscurity of our main characters (security robot, Border), and a reader-must-decide 'conclusion' somewhat spoiled an otherwise solid effort (but not enough to render it a waste of time). Three and one-half stars. ( )
  IslandDave | May 21, 2009 |
This book centres on the twin questions of what is required for beings (animals and robots especially) to be conscious and how on earth would we know if they were. He combines his considerable expertise in animal behaviour and robotics to discuss the scientific and philosophical issues surrounding these questions. The philosophical issues are dealt with comprehensively and fairly, while he never strays from a professionally sceptical position on every single point - if there isn't foolproof evidence for a position, he won't advocate it, and at times is frustrating in his global agnosticism. The writing is absorbing, at times playful and normally very interesting (particularly when he's discussing his home territory of animal behaviour), and I felt swayed by his perspective and opinions. However, my main problem with the book concerns what he left out. For a book published in 2008, he should have spent a considerable portion of the book discussing the neuroscientific issues behind his psychological points. But apart from a few lines (see p70-71) where he does acknowledge that neuroscience will probably settle these profound questions, there is no real mention of the neuroscientific advances that are informing the debate on consciousness and the question of animal minds. In addition, the writing at times is somewhat repetitious and meandering, and would clearly have benefitted from another draft or two. The book is still definitely worth reading, particularly if you are unfamiliar with the standard philosophy of mind debates, but if you are looking for answers, or even a little bit of brave speculation about what such answers might look like, this book will not help. It will instead provide a framework and invite you to make your own mind, which is fine, except for the fact that he's the expert, so I would have welcomed him to share some of his conclusions with us. ( )
1 rösta RachDan | Sep 25, 2008 |
Visar 3 av 3
inga recensioner | lägg till en recension
Du måste logga in för att ändra Allmänna fakta.
Mer hjälp finns på hjälpsidan för Allmänna fakta.
Vedertagen titel
Originaltitel
Alternativa titlar
Första utgivningsdatum
Personer/gestalter
Information från den engelska sidan med allmänna fakta. Redigera om du vill anpassa till ditt språk.
Viktiga platser
Viktiga händelser
Relaterade filmer
Priser och utmärkelser
Motto
Dedikation
Inledande ord
Citat
Avslutande ord
Särskiljningsnotis
Förlagets redaktörer
På baksidan citeras
Ursprungsspråk
Kanonisk DDC/MDS

Hänvisningar till detta verk hos externa resurser.

Wikipedia på engelska (1)

When we interact with animals, we intuitively read thoughts and feelings into their expressions and actions - it is easy to suppose that they have minds like ours. And as technology grows more sophisticated, we might soon find ourselves interpreting the behaviour of robots too in human terms.It is natural for us to humanize other beings in this way, but is it philosophically or scientifically justifiable? How different might the minds of animals or machines be to ours? As David McFarland asks here, could robots ever feel guilty, and is it correct to suppose your dog can truly behappy? Can we ever know what non-human minds might be like, or will the answer be forever out of our reach?These are central and important questions in the philosophy of mind, and this book is an accessible exploration of the differing philosophical positions that can be taken on the issue. McFarland looks not only at philosophy, but also examines new evidence from the science of animal behaviour plusthe latest developments in robotics and artificial intelligence, to show how many different - and sometimes surprising - conclusions we can draw about the nature of 'alien minds'.

Inga biblioteksbeskrivningar kunde hittas.

Bokbeskrivning
Haiku-sammanfattning

Snabblänkar

Populära omslag

Betyg

Medelbetyg: (3.19)
0.5
1
1.5
2 1
2.5
3 3
3.5 3
4 1
4.5
5

Är det här du?

Bli LibraryThing-författare.

 

Om | Kontakt | LibraryThing.com | Sekretess/Villkor | Hjälp/Vanliga frågor | Blogg | Butik | APIs | TinyCat | Efterlämnade bibliotek | Förhandsrecensenter | Allmänna fakta | 152,537,548 böcker! | Topplisten: Alltid synlig