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Laddar... Consciousness and Experience (Bradford Books) (1996)| 18 | Ingen/inga | 1,189,956 | Ingen/inga | Ingen/inga | This sequel to Lycan's Consciousness (1987) continues the elaboration of his general functionalist theory of consciousness, answers the critics of his earlier work, and expands the range of discussion to deal with the many new issues and arguments that have arisen in the intervening years--an extraordinarily fertile period for the philosophical investigation of consciousness. Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the structure of the mind, he also targets the set of really hard problems at the center of the theory of consciousness: subjectivity, qualia, and the felt aspect of experience. The key to his own enlarged and fairly argued position, which he calls the "hegemony of representation," is that there is no more to mind or consciousness than can be accounted for in terms of intentionality, functional organization, and in particular, second-order representation of one's own mental states. A Bradford Book… (mer) |
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Information från den engelska sidan med allmänna fakta. Redigera om du vill anpassa till ditt språk. For her, consciousness itself was the deepest mystery. Here, on the first Sunday in October, a miracle was being enacted for her the sky, the cedars, the lawn merely because she had two round moist lumps the size of grapes connected by tenuous sinews to the nervous system.
A. N. Wilson, Love Unknown  | |
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Information från den engelska sidan med allmänna fakta. Redigera om du vill anpassa till ditt språk. In memory of William Hiram Lycan, 1903-1994, but for whom I would never have become a philosopher, even though he hoped I would be a chemist | |
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Information från den engelska sidan med allmänna fakta. Redigera om du vill anpassa till ditt språk. Introduction: What is "The" Problem of Consciousness?
Both in philosophy and in psychology "the problem of consciousness" is supposed to be very special. It is not just the mind-body problem; few theorists question the eventual truth of materialism in some form, but many see a deep principled difficulty for the materialist in giving a plausible account of "consciousness." Nor is it just the problem of intentionality, or mental aboutness, in particular, since intentional states need not be conscious in any sense at all. 1 It has to do with the internal or subjective character of experience, paradigmatically sensory experience, and how such a thing can be accommodated in, or even tolerated by, a materialist theory of the mind. | |
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▾Hänvisningar Hänvisningar till detta verk hos externa resurser.  Wikipedia på engelska
Ingen/inga ▾Bokbeskrivningar This sequel to Lycan's Consciousness (1987) continues the elaboration of his general functionalist theory of consciousness, answers the critics of his earlier work, and expands the range of discussion to deal with the many new issues and arguments that have arisen in the intervening years--an extraordinarily fertile period for the philosophical investigation of consciousness. Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the structure of the mind, he also targets the set of really hard problems at the center of the theory of consciousness: subjectivity, qualia, and the felt aspect of experience. The key to his own enlarged and fairly argued position, which he calls the "hegemony of representation," is that there is no more to mind or consciousness than can be accounted for in terms of intentionality, functional organization, and in particular, second-order representation of one's own mental states. A Bradford Book ▾Beskrivningar från bibliotek Inga biblioteksbeskrivningar kunde hittas. ▾Beskrivningar från medlemmar på LibraryThing |
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