CUPRINS

1. Prefata - pag. 5
2. Prolog. Polonia, Germania si statele vest-europene - pag. 7
3. Capitolul 1. Timpul se scurge - pag. 26
4. Capitolul 2. Polonia prinsa la mijloc - pag. 53
5. Capitolul 3.Razboi local sau mondial ? - pag. 83
6. Capitolul 4. Esecul eforturilor pentru pace - pag. 108
7. Concluzie. De ce razboi ? - pag. 131
8. Note - pag. 147
9. Index - pag. 185 ( )

This slim volume focuses with heart-in-mouth breathlessness on the scant few days between August 24 and September 3, 1939, when Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France teeter on the brink of a war that is to be far larger than the one Hitler originally wanted. Overy lays out, with great precision, the back story of Hitler’s frustrated push for a war with Czechoslovakia the year before, and his eagerness to reclaim the land he believes was unfairly appropriated for Poland during the Great War. He appears to want a “limited war;” what he gets is an alliance between Great Britain and France, sworn to come to Poland’s aid, and events that spiral out of hand even as elder statesmen bring all of their diplomatic skills to bear to avoid a Second World War. We know how this one ends, but it doesn’t diminish the day-by day retelling, and the vain hope that the reader can somehow avert all-out war. ( )

A quick, interesting read about the diplomatic lead-up to the start of the Second World War. In particular, this is summer 1939, with a lot of August, and mainly in Britain, France, and Germany, with a tad of Poland and mentions of Italy, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. More about Soviet maneuverings may have been beneficial, but this is a solid, thought-provoking account. Well told and engaging, I have found some of Overy's books in the past boring. All is solidly researched in the primary sources, something Overy never fails at. One map, no images, no bibliography; source notes and index. ( )

This is a very quick read, worthwhile for anyone interested in the thinking of Hitler, as well as the leaders of the English, French, and Poles, in the week immediately preceeding the breakout of World War II. Hitler was determined to have Danzig and his Polish corridor, and was willing to believe that the French and British would back down rather than enter into a war over the matter. The British and French, on the other hand, hoped that their strong stance in support of Poland, and their stated committment to support of the Polish state would deter Hitler. Both sides, and Overy shows, were mistaken in their thinking, and the diplomatic exchanges proved ineffective. Reading about the thinking of both sides in the leadup to WW II was both informative and interesting. ( )

Excellent bref ouvrage ( )