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Disobeying Hitler – Some did!

Disobeying Hitler by Randall Hansen is an excellently researched and written account of those few senior German officers who disobeyed Hitler’s orders and could have faced execution themselves. This book accounts for the German resistance in the final years of the war after the executions of von Stauffenberg and Rommel in July 1944.

When the Russians started turning the tide of the war and pushing back the German Army Hitler gave orders that not an inch of ground was not to be given and a scorched earth policy was placed up on the command and mayors. Nowhere was this example truer than the destruction of Warsaw after the uprising when not a building was left standing and human suffering was the highest.

Some officers and citizens saw that this plan was utter madness and this book gives their account. Some of the opposition was to save some of the cities of Germany from complete destruction with the withdrawal of the army and the coming allies. A common sense approach one could say.

There are three chapters given over to General Choltitz and his actions in saving Paris from being levelled to the ground. Hansen makes it clear that was not due to ideological difference he was as anti-Semitic as other German officers. He did put up some sort of resistance towards the defence of Paris, enough to convince Hitler he was doing all he could to hold the city. More practically Choltitz did not have the men or equipment to hold or destroy Paris.

Hansen also examines the German Army’s willingness in the murder of Jews that it was not all down to the SS. He is trying to make people understand that the SS were not alone in anti-Semite actions.

We also see Albert Speer’s actions examined, the munitions minister who wanted to preserve as much as he could. Hansen also points out that this was probably more down to his own self-preservation.

Disobeying Hitler has been well researched and highlights the much forgotten story of the very few who actually ignored Hitler’s ranting orders. He does show that there were fanatics in both in the SS and army who were willing to destroy everything and everyone as the pulled back to Berlin. This is about those who for varying reasons did the opposite. Hopefully this book will remind people that there were others who opposed Hitler other than the participants in the July plot of 1944.

This is an excellent history well written and well researched giving us a glimpse at some of the morally hazy individuals who were making decisions to save what they could for after the war. This book brings their stories to life and is a reminder that it is sometimes the decisions we make not to do something can be as important as what we decide to do.
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atticusfinch1048 | 1 annan recension | Aug 22, 2014 |
This is a scholarly yet very readable chronicle of German resistance to Hitler's oppressive rule during the later years of the war in 1944 and 1945. After World War II ended many Germans tried to disassociate themselves from or to lessen their involvement in the Nazi regime and it's atrocities. The author, Randall Hansen, has sifted through this quagmire of self effacement to find the true stories of German disobedience. After the failed attempt by a few members of the German military to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, there were no other organized attempts on his life, but the strength of his personal aura faded. Some military and civilian leaders as well as individual citizens became more animated in their defiance of his orders. In these latter years some people started to look beyond the inevitable end of the war toward what they wanted for Germany and its people after the end of the Nazi regime. They could not and would not follow orders to scorch and burn their homeland merely to deny it to the enemy. Some Germans saw the Western Allies as saviors from not only the Nazis, but also from the Soviets. Stories are recorded of military commanders and civilian leaders who openly defied Hitler's orders to destroy their own cities rather than to surrender. Following these orders would have meant the total destruction of cities and their infrastructures leaving tens or even hundreds of thousands with even less than had already been taken from them by years of war. Not following these orders often meant death for the individual. A very interesting look at a little talked about view of some of the German people in World War II. Book provided for review by Amazon Vine.
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Ronrose1 | 1 annan recension | Jun 18, 2014 |
Randall Hansen writes clearly and vividly, describing the British and American bombing campaigns against Germany in World War II. The plural in the previous sentence is one of his points: that the British and Americans conducted two separate and uncoordinated strategic bombing campaigns against Germany. His focus is on the bombing of Germany, so he does not cover in much detail other bombing campaigns where the British and Americans cooperated more effectively, such as the campaign against the French transport system before D-Day.

One of his examples of this lack of cooperation was that after the American daytime raid on Schweinfurt, the Germans feared that RAF bombers would show up that night and disrupt their recovery efforts by plastering the area with incendiary bombs, and that such an attack might prevent them from resuming production there at all. According to Hansen, the Germans were amazed that the RAF never showed up at Schweinfurt, and that the Americans did not follow up there, either.

The person who emerges as the big villain in Hansen's account is Arthur "Bomber" Harris. The British bombing campaign, in particular, was calculated terror bombing aimed specifically at civilians. Harris conceived this campaign and continued to press it home throughout the war, even when it became clear that this was not breaking German morale, that concentrating on other targets (such as oil and transportation) would more materially damage the German war effort, that improved technology and techniques removed the need for blanket area bombing, and even when Churchill gave him a more or less direct order to cease area bombing and concentrate on assigned targets. Amazingly, when Harris pushed back against this directive, Churchill did not reprimand him but caved in and praised Harris for his service to the country.
 
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quizshow77 | 3 andra recensioner | Aug 9, 2011 |
Good description of the campaign and exploration of the bombing controversy over area vs. precision targets. Worth reading, if only for the extensive presentation of the correspondence between Portal and Harris. Portal, despite being the superior officer cannot budge Harris off of area bombing. Harris was blatantly disobeying orders and Portal was too weak to sack him.½
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GeoKaras | 3 andra recensioner | Dec 17, 2009 |
Very interesting, well written, well researched and probably controversial book. Hansen describes the fundamental difference between the British and the American approaches to bombing Germany: an "eliminationist" strategy of area bombing to destroy cities vs precision bombing with priority focus on military objectives. In Hansen's view: "Over the course of the war, the bombing that damaged Germany worse was American". The Americans accepted a higher ratio of losses through their daylight campaigns, and one reason was their concern with the moral implications of bombing civilians as the prime target.

Hansen concludes: "Moral clarity has two sides to it: it gives the Allied war aims moral purpose and it defines the limits within which those aims are pursued. Germany unilaterally launched a war that brought death, destruction, and suffering to tens of millions of people around the globe. The defeat of Germany was both a geopolitical and moral necessity, and the Allies were right to mobilize all of their resources in achieving this goal. It was inevitable that ordinary Germans would find themselves the victims of events. None of this, however, can justify the degree of death and destruction meted out by Harris and tolerated (if intermittently) by Churchill."

The book is also an interesting study on the role of individuals in history. Despite growing qualms about the effectiveness of area bombing, especially after 1943, despite "Bomber" Harris's deliberate blocking of precision bombing against ball bearings, oil, the Luftwaffe and transportation that so damaged the German cause, and this against clear directions set out, despite Harris continuing to level cities right up to the end of the war, no one had the nerve to call him on it and force a change. Churchill could have stopped it but did not. A thoughtful and thought-provoking book.
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John | 3 andra recensioner | Dec 1, 2009 |
We'll Bomb them into the Stone Age

It's one of the big philosophical questions of the twentieth century given the totality of destruction WWII had on humanity. In "Fire and Fury," scholar and professor Randall Hansen explores the ethical dimension of the use of area bombing by both the axis and the allies during the war.

Hansen begins the book with an anecdote about the controversy over how to memorialize the bomber squadrons that participated in WWII in the Museum of Canada. He asks: "How can we judge the role that bombing played in the Allied victory? What role does morality play in the execution and evaluation of war?" Hansen goes on to quote Goebbles who said: "we all end up as the greatest heroes or the greatest war criminals."

Hansen's central thesis is: the area bombing (aka carpet bombing) of Germany by the allies failed to achieve its primary objective of destroying industrial armament production and in fact prolonged it.

Throughout the body of the book, Hansen explores the rather ambiguous objectives of area bombing. While superficially stated, the purpose was to destroy the German industry, implicitly many Generals interpreted the purpose to destroy public morale. Hansen concludes that Generals such as Curtis LeMay of the US and Sir Arthur Harris of the RAF felt they had carte blanche to "bomb them into the stone age."

The two major events with major moral implications are: why bombing wasn't used to end Auschwitz; and why was the bombing of Dresden so complete?

The first question has been asked many times. Hansen concludes that by Apr 1944, the first documented record of when the Allied leaders became aware of the concentration camps, 95% of the approx 7 million Jews killed had already taken place, so in the end it would not have saved that many. Still, the logic the Generals gave for not bombing Auschwitz was that the bombs were not precise enough and risked killing civilians. So, they turned around and carpet bombed Berlin, then Dresden killing close to a half million German civilians, where's the logic in that?

Regarding Dresden, Hansen leaves the most destructive bombing campaign of the European theater for last. The stories are horrific, of babies being burned to death in their mother's arms, the totality of it, really sickening for sure. The complete and utter devastation of Dresden left no doubt that the goal of the bombing campaign all along was the "long striven for goal of destroying the 50 leading industrial cities."

Hansen concludes that the memorialization and historiography of the bombing of Germany tends to justify the bombing of innocent civilians based on the faulty assumptions that it somehow prevented more Jews from being killed, and that it helped to bring the war to an end earlier. I was somewhat disappointed that despite the larger moral questions Hansen begins the book with, he ultimately decides to skirt an answer to this fundamentally philosophical question in his conclusion by sticking by his empirical evidence and simply concludes that it was a "moral and strategic failure." Why not answer the moral question directly: was the bombing a war crime? In not doing so Hansen contradicts himself when he states: "We cannot shy away from this conclusion out of a fear of giving succour to the far right or of offending the RAF."

I thought Hansen supported his thesis well overall though I definitely felt that certain chapters of the book acted more as filler than fully supporting his argument, but for a commercial book, I suppose that is OK.

Overall, I think the book is a decent exploration into one of the larger moral implications of bombing and its use in war, specifically in WWII. I would have to say that a basic background in the war is necessary, otherwise you won't understand the basic sequence of events. Despite a few minor flaws, I recommend "Fire and Fury" for anyone wanting to learn more about WWII.
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bruchu | 3 andra recensioner | Nov 30, 2008 |
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